INTRODUCTION
Since Niebuhr's (1929) classic analysis of the social sources of denominationalism, researchers have investigated the degree to which religious groups can be ordered along a status hierarchy based primarily on the socioeconomic standing of their members. By the middle of the twentieth century, researchers had conducted the first comprehensive studies of denominational socioeconomic rankings (Cantril 1943; Pope 1948 ). Pope's (1948) analysis of data collected in the late 1930s by the American Institute of Public Opinion showed that Episcopalians, Congregationalists, Presbyterians and Jews occupied the upper socioeconomic ranks based on their income and educational attainment. Methodists, Lutherans, Catholics, and Baptists ranked lower on socioeconomic indicators. Lazerwitz (1964) , analyzing data from the Census Bureau's 1957 survey of religion in America, formulated a three-tiered hierarchy of religious groups based on their socioeconomic position. Episcopalians, Jews, and Presbyterians were positioned at the top; Methodists, Lutherans, and Catholics occupied the middle ranks; and white and black Baptists were at the bottom.
Subsequent research in the 1960s and 1970s reinforced the findings of the earlier studies (Demerath 1965; Glenn and Hyland 1967; Goldstein 1969; Davidson 1977; Roof 1979; Greeley 1981) . Researchers emphasized that there were noteworthy socioeconomic differences among the major Protestant religious categories (Liberal, Moderate, Conservative, and Black Protestants). The consensus was that Liberal Protestants (Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Congregationalists/ UCCs) and Jews ranked highest in income, educational attainment, and occupational prestige. Ranked just below these groups were those with no religious preference ("nonaffiliates")-Catholics and Moderate Protestants (e.g., Lutherans, Methodists, Disciples of Christ) occupied the middle ranks of the status hierarchy, with Black and Conservative Protestants (e.g.. Southern Baptists, Nazarenes, Churches of God, Assemblies of God) positioned at the bottom (Roof and McKinney 1987:109-110) .
However, some analysts have argued that the social bases of denominationalism are no longer as important as they once were in separating America's faith traditions (Wuthnow 1988; Christopher 1989; Park and Reimer 2002; Stark 2003 .) Wuthnow (1988) suggested that the boundaries separating the major religious traditions have been recast since World War II. Rising levels of education have contributed to a decUne in inter-denominational status differences, resulting in a pattern of convergence among the various denominations in terms of their demographic characteristics. The implication is that the status ordering of religious groups is not as clearly defined as it once was. Park and Reimer (2002) lend support to the claim that denominational socioeconomic boundaries have blurred in recent decades, and they disagree with the status theories of Pope (1941) and Glock (1964) , which focus on social or economic deprivation as a basis for sectarian affiliation. Park and Reimer suggest that "class has a weak effect on religious affiliation, since both the rich and poor are attracted to sects " (2002:741-742) . Stark (2003) agrees that social class is an unreliable predictor of religious adherence today. Arguing against deprivation theories of religiosity. Stark maintains that members of evangelical and fundamentalist Protestant groups "are as likely to have gone to college and to earn high incomes as are members of more liberal denominations as well as Roman Catholics" (2003:6) .
Despite these claims, other researchers have found that America's major faith traditions continue to be distinguished on the basis of the social standing of their members (Davidson 1994; Davidson, Pyle and Reyes 1995; Darnell and Sherkat 1997; Coreno 2002; Keister 2003) . Several studies have emphasized the persistence of socioeconomic distinctions between "mainline" and conservative Protestants. Davidson, Pyle and Reyes (1995) and Pyle (1996) studied the religious characteristics of individuals listed in Who's Who in America and found that Liberal Protestants were disproportionately over-represented among the nation's business, political, and cultural elites from the 1930s to the 1990s. Baptists and sectarians were substantially under-represented among Who's Who listees during the same period. Darnell and Sherkat (1997) , in a study of education and religious adherence, found a negative link between fundamentalism and educational attainment, which partly explains the persisting socioeconomic deficits for Conservative Protestants.^ Coreno (2002) found significant differences between mainline and Conservative Protestants in terms of their education, income, and occupational prestige, with mainliners having more education, greater incomes, and more prestigious occupations. Keister (2003) looking at religious affiliation and the accumulation of wealth found that conservative Protestants have significantly less wealth than Jews, Catholics, and mainline Protestants.
The discordant findings of previous studies may result from the use of different study populations, different denominational classification schemes, and limited measures of socioeconomic status. Some of the studies rely on national survey data; others use biographical directories or surveys of college students. Researchers also use different denominational classification methods. Some use the classification approach developed by Steensland, Park, Regnerus, Robinson, Wilcox, and Woodberry (2000) , which divides white Protestants into just two categories (mainline and evangelical). This approach merges Liberal and Moderate Protestants together into a generic mainline category. However, other studies have highlighted the socioeconomic distinctions between Liberal and Moderate Protestants. In addition, several studies use limited or compressed income measures (e.g., those whose uppermost category for family income is "$25,000 or over"), which may lead researchers to exaggerate the degree to which religious group socioeconomic differentials are converging. Thus in the context of conflicting claims about the degree to which we have witnessed the erosion of denominational socioeconomic differences in recent decades, there is a need to analyze religious group socioeconomic rankings since the 1970s.
THEORY
Two general theoretical perspectives, sometimes referred to as "fair play" and "fair shares" approaches, are used to frame opposing perspectives in studies of social inequality (Ryan 1981) . These approaches have different assumptions about the nature of society, the distribution of power, and trends in mobility and equality. We can use these general approaches to highlight contrasting perspectives on the topic of religious stratification in America. Beyerlein (2004) says that fundamentalist and Pentecostal Protestants are less likely than other religious groups to be college educated, but he finds that self-identified evangelicals are more likely than other Protestants to earn a four-year degree.
The Fair Play Approach
Fair play theory is grounded on the assumption that we have witnessed a weakening of denominational status distinctions owing to a reconfiguration of religious group boundaries and structural changes in education and the economy. The idea that the social roots of denominationalism are receding in importance can be traced back at least to the 1950s and 1960s (see Glock and Stark 1965) . Herberg (1960) in his discussion of the triple melting pot believed that the convergence of major religious perspectives signaled a blurring of older patterns of denominational distinctiveness. In the same way, Wuthnow (1988) emphasized that denominational boundaries in America had shifted since mid-century. Wuthnow argued that increasing education for the population has been associated with a general restructuring of American religion. As a consequence, the older demographic distinctions that used to separate the major religious groupings are no longer as important as they once were. The trend is toward a blurring of the older denominational status divisions.
A decline of denominationalism perspective is in tune with a theoretical tradition suggesting that a decline in status group differences is a consequence of modernization and society's march toward universalism (Knottnerus 1987 , Turner 1993 ). This general approach, which received its fullest expression in the writings of Talcott Parsons (1951 Parsons ( , 1971 , suggests that earlier structural supports which perpetuated the economic and social privileges of formerly dominant racial, ethnic, religious, and social class groupings are being eliminated as a result of societal modernization and an increasing emphasis on universalistic, as opposed to particularistic, processes of occupational allocation. Such a trend toward universalism is associated with the expansion and democratization of higher education, growth in the professional and technical sectors of society, and a decline in the importance of an ascriptive basis for stratification (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992) . Modern social systems are increasingly characterized by meritocratic principles of occupational selection and promotion (Turner 1993) , and a general trend of class and status convergence is thus characteristic of advanced societal development (Knottnerus 1987) . The fair play perspective emphasizes that a leveling of status group differences is a hyproduct of converging levels of income and education that are part of the larger evolutionary processes associated with societal modernization. Park and Reimer (2002) bring forth this line of reasoning, arguing that with respect to denominational divisions, "certain demographic distinctives, particularly those related to social status, will slowly converge" (742). Why the convergence? The authors suggest that a decline in denominational status differences can he explained by increases in social mobility, the spread and availability of information technology, the uhiquity of the media, greater participation in higher education, and greater ethnic and religious pluralism. Thus a trend toward universalism and a leveling of group differences is associated with the erosion of status houndaries hetween the major faith traditions.
Fair shares theory emphasizes that structural inequalities contribute to the maintenance of status boundaries between religious groups. This view is reflected in Niebuhr's (1929) discussion of the social sources of denominationalism, which emphasized that denominational divisions are reflective of social divisions in the larger society, particularly status divisions rooted in relative privilege and disprivilege. Niebuhr argued that the division of Christian churches into denominations closely follows the division of individuals "into the castes of national, racial, and economic groups" (1929:6). Niebuhr's explanation for the social sources of American denominationalism is based on his interpretation of the church-sect distinction, first articulated by Weber (1958) .
The church, as an ideal type, is an inclusive organization that is accommodated to the larger society. Churches tend to embrace modernist theologies and are characterized by formal, orderly worship services. Churches tend to support existing social values, and they serve as the preferred religious forms for the middle and upper classes. Niebuhr argued that the lower classes are more likely to join sects, which are voluntary associations characterized by a high degree of tension with the larger society. Niebuhr stressed that "the religion of the economically disenfranchised classes has distinct ethical and psychological characteristics, corresponding to the needs of these groups" (1929:30). Emotional fervor is one common mark, along with informal worship, lay leaders, a propensity toward millenarianism, and resistance to compromise with worldly morality. Thus churches and sects differ in the degree to which they appeal to individuals in the lower, middle, and upper classes.
Related to this discussion is Weber's analysis of elective affinities as a factor explaining the different religious orientations of privileged and non-privileged strata (1946:284) . Weber emphasized that members of different social classes adopt different belief systems, or theodicies, to account for worldly success or misfortune. The affluent tend to embrace good fortune theodicies, which emphasize that prosperity is a blessing from God. Theodicies of misfortune, on the other hand, appeal to the poor and "furnish suffering with a plus sign " (1946:274) by emphasizing that suffering in this world will be rewarded in the next. Weber's discussion of elective affinities suggests that people of high or low social station choose different religious expressions that correspond to their special needs. Status houndaries between religious groups are thus reflective of social divisions within the larger society. The boundaries persist to the degree that the various faith traditions embrace distinctive beliefs, practices, and styles of worship that have differential appeal to individuals of high or low social standing.
A Modified Fair Shares Approach
A modified fair shares perspective accepts the fair shares view that denominationalism is reinforced hy social inequities, but it also acknowledges some blurring of denominational status boundaries since the 1960s, owing to evolving reli-gious constituencies and changes in the structure of education and the economy. Shifting patterns of religious affiliation since the 1970s have contributed to changes in socioeconomic boundaries between religious groups. Membership declines for colonial mainline denominations and membership increases for conservative Protestant bodies (Kelley 1978; Hout, Greeley and Wilde 2001 ) suggest a restructuring of denominational power and influence. Pentecostal and Holiness churches are increasingly part of America's cultural mainstream and no longer identified as churches of the disinherited (Poloma 1989) . A sizeable increase in the proportion of Americans indicating no religious preference since 1990 suggests a reconfiguration of denominational allegiances (Hout and Fischer 2002) . Patterns of upward mobility for conservative and Black Protestants (Smith, Emerson, Gallagher, Kennedy and Sikkink 1998; Gilkes 1998 ) along with a decline in upward switching in response to social mobility (Hadaway and Marler 1993) can contribute to a blurring of status differences among religious groups.
Other demographic changes since the 1970s have influenced the social composition of American religious groups (Hout, Greeley, and Wilde 2001) . Changes in the nation's immigration laws starting in 1965 have resulted in a significant increase in the number of immigrants from Asian and Latin American countries. The post-1965 immigrants differ from the earlier waves of European immigrants in their educational and economic resources (Jasso, Massey, Rozenzweig and Smith 2003) . The large influx of Latinos after 1965 has contributed to greater socioeconomic diversity among American Catholics.
These developments can serve to redefine the socioeconomic boundaries between religious traditions. Nevertheless, the expectation is that socioeconomic distinctions between the major faith traditions will persist, even in the face of changing demographics and affiliation patterns. Given the argument that denominational divisions are partly reflective of larger patterns of structural inequality, we should expect that the perpetuation of class divisions in the general population should be associated with the maintenance of religious subcultures that draw memhers from different socioeconomic strata (Coreno 2002) . Despite claims of increasing universalism and widespread social mohility, trends in the distribution of income and wealth in the last thirty years suggest a pattern of persisting economic divisions in the larger society (Wolff 2002) . Although education levels have increased for all members of society, the influence of education in promoting social mobility has declined since the 1970s (Hout 1988; Rytina 2000) . Occupational changes in recent decades, such as growth in the number of service sector positions, increasing trends in outsourcing and subemployment practices, along with a decline in domestic manufacturing have consequences in terms of reinforcing class differences and promoting polarization between workers in primary and secondary labor markets.
Socialization and social reproduction factors contribute to the perpetuation of denominational boundaries. Just as individuals inherit a social status from their parents, they also inherit religiously based cultural capital (e.g., religious knowl-edge and familiarity with helief systems and styles of worship), which influences affiliation patterns throughout the life course. Most Americans remain in the religious group into which they were born (Sherkat and Wilson 1995) , and to the degree that social class factors have influenced affiliation patterns in past generations, there will be some holdover effect for subsequent generations. Thus social reproduction plays a role in the maintenance of denominational status distinctions.
A modified fair shares perspective suggests that as economic inequality persists in the larger society, denominational subcultures will continue to embrace distinct theologies, styles of worship, and participation norms that have differential appeal to those of high or low social station. Despite some fluctuation in religious group socioeconomic differentials in recent decades, the expectation is that the major denominational groupings will continue to he distinguished on the basis of their relative socioeconomic positioning. Although there will have been some moderation of socioeconomic differences among the religious traditions, the relative ranking of the major religious categories will remain the same. Jews and Liberal Protestants will continue to occupy the upper ranks; Catholics, Moderate Protestants, and Nonaffiliates should be placed in the middle; and Black and Conservative Protestants will be positioned at the bottom.
DATA
The 1972-2000 General Social Surveys (GSS) were used to analyze socioeconomic differences among religious groups in recent decades (Davis, Smith and Marsden 2001) . The large number of cases (over 40,000) included in this data file permits an analysis of denominational socioeconomic scores for three time periods (1972-1980, 1982-1990, and 1991-2000) .
Respondents were classified into 25 denominational categories, in accord with the classification method presented in Roof and McKinney (1987:253-256) . Members of Protestant denominations were assigned to four major categories (Liberal, Moderate, Conservative, and Black Protestant) following Roof and McKinney's classification scheme. The classification of Protestants into these categories is based primarily on theological heritage, history, group experience, race, social class, and other factors (Roof and McKinney 1987:79) . Catholics, Jews, Nonaffiliates, and All Others (Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, Unitarians, Christian Scientists, and Others) were also included in the analysis.R oof and McKinney's classification method is far from ideal. For instance, Baptists were classified as Southern or Northern based on their region and not based on their specific affiliation. Nevertheless, Roof and McKinney's classification can be used to consistently track the major faith traditions throughout all cycles of the GSS, and unlike the classification approach advocated by Steensland et al. (2000) , it distinguishes between Liberal, Moderate, and Conservative Protestants.
To facilitate a compatison of denominational socioeconomic diffetences over time, scores were tallied for income, education, and occupational prestige during three time periods (1972-1980, 1982-1990, 1991-2000) . To assess income levels, NORC's REALINC was used, which indicates family income measured in constant dollars. (See http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/GSS.) Using a constant measure of income facilitates comparisons across time, and it also avoids the prohlem of compressed income scores associated with measures that use "$25,000 or over" as the highest income category. EDUC (years of school completed) and PRESTIGE (occupational prestige scores) were also used in the analysis. PRESTIGE (used in the 1972-1990 surveys) was replaced by PRESTG80, which was used for the 1991-2000 analysis.
To generate an overall socioeconomic index, an additive scale was constructed. First, REALINC, EDUC, and PRESTIGE (1972 -1990 ) or PRESTG80 (1991 -2000 were rescaled (1-low, 2-medium, 3-high) and then combined to form a 7-category Socioeconomic index: INDEXST was used for the [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] surveys (Cronbach's alpha = .63), and INDEXSV was used for the 1991-2000 surveys (Cronbach's alpha= .66). Standard scores were computed in order to indicate each group's socioeconomic scdte relative to the population mean. These scores allow a comparison across the time periods to provide an indication of change relative to the national mean on the socioeconomic index. However, minor fluctuations in the ahsolute value of the scores are to he expected owing to measurement error and variation in sampling procedures.
Regression analysis (OLS) was used to examine religious group socioeconomic differences after controlling for a number of exogenous factors. The major faith categories were dummy coded, with Moderate Protestants serving as the comparison category. To control for the influence of parental education and occupation on socioeconomic outcomes, PAEDUC (father's educational attainment) and PAPRES16 (father's occupational prestige) were included in the analysis. (PAPRES80 was substituted for the 1991-2000 period.) Dummy variables were also included to control for region (NORTHEAST), urban/rural residence (URBAN), and marital status (MARRIED). Controls for age and sex were also included in the regression analysis. Educational attainment (EDUC) was also used as a control in the analysis of income and occupational prestige. Protestants consistently occupied the middle ranks of the socioeconomic hierarchy, with scores of .00, .02, and -.01 during the three periods. Groups in the All Others category were positioned above Catholics and Moderate Protestants, with scores of .11, .23, and .18.^ Catholic scores ranged from .01 in the 1970s to .07 in the 1990s. Conservative Protestants and Black Protestants had the lowest socioeconomic rankings. The scores for Conservative Protestants from the 1970s to the 1990s were -.30, -.35, and -.25. Black Protestants had the lowest scores, but the socioeconomic deficits for Black Protestants moderated over the years (rising from -.56 in the 1970s to -.43 in the 1990s), indicating some improvement in the socioeconomic positioning of Black Protestants. Figure 1 indicates some narrowing of differences between Liberal Protestants and the other Protestant traditions since the 1970s. At the same time, the overall socioeconomic ranking of the major Protestant traditions has not changed from the 1970s to the 1990s. One noteworthy change is the decline in the scores for Nonaffiliates (falling from .29 in the 1970s to .05 in the 1990s). "Religious Nones" previously ranked close to Liberal Protestants on socioeconomic indicators (Roof and McKinney 1987) , but today those with no religious preference are positioned near the center of the rankings. Table 1 examines the effects of religious adherence on the socioeconomic measure after controlling for individual and family background traits. Coefficients for the religious category variables estimate the difference in socioeconomic scores for each religious group relative to the comparison category of Moderate Protestants, after controlling for the other independent variables.
The patterns seen in Figure 1 are repeated in the multivariate analysis. During all three periods, Jews and Liberal Protestants scored significantly higher on the socioeconomic index than Moderate Protestants. Conservative and Black Protestants scored significantly lower. The unstandardized coefficients for Nonaffiliates declined after the 1970s (from .295 to .140) and the coefficients for Black Protestants increased (from -.534 to -.259). There were no significant differences between Moderate Protestants and groups collectively included in the All Others category. Although socioeconomic differences between Catholics and the comparison group were negligible during the 1970s, by the 1990s Catholic scores were significantly higher than those for Moderate Protestants.
The standardized coefficients (Betas) provide an indication of the relative importance of the predictor variables during each time period. We can see that marital status (Beta = .216), father's education (Beta = .270), and father's occupational prestige (Beta = .131) had the greatest impact on socioeconomic scores. (Beta scores are for the 1990s.) Age, sex, and urban residence also influenced socioeconomic outcomes. The only indicator not significantly affecting the socioeconomic measure was Northeast residence.
-^During the 1991-2000 period, the scores ranged from 1.20 for Unitarians to -.39 for Jehovah's Witnesses. Mormon scores ranged from .10 in the 1970s to .19 in the 1990s. The scores for the individual groups in the All Others category are subject to some fluctuation owing to the relatively small numher of cases. Tables 2-4 provide results for regression analyses using income, education, and occupational prestige as dependent variables. Table 2 looks at religious group effects on income after controlling for sociodemograpbic variables. Jews are clearly set apart from tbe otber religious categories in terms of family income, and it appears tbat tbe income surpluses for Jews increased after the 1970s. Liberal Protestants (along witb Catbolics by tbe 1990s) also scored significantly bigber tban Moderate Protestants on tbe income measure. Conservative Protestants bad significantly lower income scores tban tbe comparison group during all tbree periods, as did All Otbers in tbe 1980s. Black Protestant scores were also significantly lower tban tbose of Moderate Protestants in tbe 1970s and 1980s, but not in tbe 1990s. Table 2 indicates persisting income differences between tbe major religious traditions. Liberal Protestants bad significantly bigber scores tban tbe otber Protestant groups during all periods. Catbolics moved up a bit in terms of family income, as did Black Protestants, but tbe overall rankings bave not cbanged mucb during tbe period. Looking at tbe otber variables, we see tbat educational attainment (Beta = .285) and marital status (Beta = .329) bad tbe greatest effect on income scores. (Figures are for tbe 1990s. ) Age, fatber's education and occupation, Nortbeast and urban residence, and sex were also significant predictors of income.
Education
Religious group scores on education are presented in Table 3 . Jews and Liberal Protestants bad significantly bigber educational attainment scores tban Moderate Protestants during all periods. All Otbers also bad significantly bigber scores in tbe 1980s and 1990s. Black Protestants and Conservative Protestants scored significantly lower during all periods. Educational scores for Nonaffiliates declined after tbe 1970s. Tbere were no significant differences between Catbolics and Moderate Protestants on tbe educational measure during tbe 1980s and 1990s, altbougb Catbolics bad significantly lower scores in tbe 1970s.
Tbese results indicate tbat tbere are. important differences in educational attainment among tbe religious categories. Witb tbe exception of tbe changing scores for Nonaffiliates and All Otbers, tbere is not mucb evidence of a trend toward convergence in religious group educational differentials. Among tbe sociodemograpbic variables, fatber's education (Beta = .342) and fatber's occupational prestige (Beta = .198) served as tbe best predictors of educational attainment in tbe 1990s, althougb urban residence and marital status were also important factors.
Occupational Prestige
In terms of occupational prestige, tbere were no significant religious category effects in tbe 1990s (see Table 4 ). However, in tbe 1970s Black Protestants and All Otbers scored lower tban Moderate Protestants on tbe occupational measure. During tbe 1980s Jews and Liberal Protestants bad significantly higher occupa- (witb Beta scores ranging from .564 in tbe 1970s to .524 in tbe 1990s). Age, marital status, and fatber's occupational prestige also bad significant effects on tbe dependent variable.
CONCLUSION
Tbe overall findings are consistent witb a modified fair sbares account of persistence and cbange in denominational socioeconomic differences. Despite some narrowing of differences among tbe religious categories on socioeconomic indicators, religious groups continue to be distinguisbed on tbe basis of tbeir socioeconomic positioning, and tbe overall religious group status ranking remains largely uncbanged from tbe rankings of fifty years ago. Jews and Liberal Protestants remain at tbe top, Catbolics and Modetate Ptotestants continue to occupy tbe middle tanks of tbe socioeconomic bierarchy, and Black and Conservative Protestants remain at tbe bottom. Tbe deficits for Black Protestants bave lessened during tbe period, indicating some advance in tbeir relative socioeconomic standing. Nevertbeless, Black Protestants continue to rank near tbe bottom of tbe socioeconomic scale.
Of note is tbe decline in tbe relative socioeconomic standing of tbose witb no religious preference, wbo bave moved from an elevated socioeconomic position tbirty years ago to tbe middle of tbe rankings today. Tbis decline bas been accompanied by an increase in the size of tbe Nonaffiliate population in recent years. Tbe proportion of Americans reporting no religious preference doubled from 7 percent to 14 percent in tbe 1990s (Hout and Fiscber 2002) . It seems that such a rapid increase in the population of Nonaffiliates during a short period has resulted in a reconfiguration of the group's demographic base. No longer can it be said that "those with no religious affiliation exceed the national average today on every status indicator" (Roof and McKinney 1987:114) .
The results show that Jews and Liberal Protestants continue to score bigber on the income measure than Moderate, Conservative, and Black Protestants. At the same time, the income deficits for Black Protestants moderated after the 1970s, and the income scores for Catholics have increased. Jews and Liberal Protestants also score highest on the educational measure, and there is little indication of converging educational scores among the major Protestant traditions. It is premature to claim tbat Conservative Protestants are as likely as Catholics and Liberal Protestants to bave completed college. However, there appear to be no religious category effects on tbe occupational prestige measure after controlling for sociodemographic factors. Age and educational attainment are the best predictors of occupational prestige scores.
Despite claims of the declining importance of denominational socioeconomic distinctions, American faith traditions continue to be stratified on the basis of their socioeconomic standing. How then do we account for the fact that some researchers suggest that denominational socioeconomic diffetences ate no longer important, whereas other researchers argue that they are? Part of the problem is rooted in terminology and religious categorization differences. Researchers who argue that evangelicals have similar levels of educational attainment as other Protestants are probably correct, as long as the evangelical/non-evangelical dis-
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tinction is based on respondents' self-identification as evangelicals and is not based on specific denominational affiliation. However, in popular usage, the term "evangelical" is often equated with "conservative Protestantism," and thus confusion results when researchers make claims about the educational differences between evangelicals and mainline Protestants.
Contradictory findings regarding religious group socioeconomic distinctions are explained in part by the different terminologies and classification schemes that researchers employ. Classification approaches that combine Liberal Protestants and Moderate Protestants into a generic "mainline" category gloss over important bistorical distinctions between tbese two traditions. This is a significant oversight because religious group socioeconomic differences are in large measure a product of history. Liberal Protestants have enjoyed political and economic advantages in America since the colonial era (Pyle and Davidson 2003) . Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists/UCCs bave bad greater opportunities than others to accumulate family wealth and transmit their privileges to offspring. Although Liberal Protestants no longer dominate tbe society's major hierarchies the way they once did, they are distinguished from the other Protestant traditions on the basis of their elevated socioeconomic positioning. Consequently, future studies of religion and social stratification should retain the conceptual distinction between Liberal and Moderate Protestants. Studies should also use expanded measures of income and avoid using measures for which "$25,000 or more" is the highest category. The limited scaling of these measures compresses income differences, especially in recent years as average income levels have increased.
Today we continue to see the perpetuation of socioeconomic differences between the major religious traditions. The evidence presented here suggests that groups falling toward the "sect" end of the church-sect continuum are more likely to attract individuals of lower socioeconomic standing than are those religious bodies traditionally viewed as culture affirming mainline denominations. Because of differences among religious groups in terms of their worship styles, emphasis placed on doctrinal orthodoxy, and tension with the larger sociocultural environment, they have differential appeal to those of high or low socioeconomic standing. While there has been some alteration in religious group socioeconomic differentials from the 1970s to the 1990s, the overall status ranking of religious groups remains largely unchanged.
